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Abstract—Instant Messaging (IM) applications like Telegram,
Signal, and WhatsApp have become extremely popular in recent
years. Unfortunately, such IM services have been targets of
continuous governmental surveillance and censorship, as these
services are home to public and private communication channels
on socially and politically sensitive topics. To protect their clients,
popular IM services deploy state-of-the-art encryption mecha-
nisms. In this paper, we show that despite the use of advanced
encryption, popular IM applications leak sensitive information
about their clients to adversaries who merely monitor their
encrypted IM traffic, with no need for leveraging any software
vulnerabilities of IM applications. Specifically, we devise traffic
analysis attacks that enable an adversary to identify adminis-
trators as well as members of target IM channels (e.g., forums)
with high accuracies. We believe that our study demonstrates a
significant, real-world threat to the users of such services given
the increasing attempts by oppressive governments at cracking
down controversial IM channels.
We demonstrate the practicality of our traffic analysis attacks
through extensive experiments on real-world IM communications.
We show that standard countermeasure techniques such as
adding cover traffic can degrade the effectiveness of the attacks
we introduce in this paper. We hope that our study will encourage
IM providers to integrate effective traffic obfuscation counter-
measures into their software. In the meantime, we have designed
and deployed an open-source, publicly available countermeasure
system, called IMProxy, that can be used by IM clients with no
need for any support from IM providers. We have demonstrated
the effectiveness of IMProxy through experiments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Instant Messaging (IM) applications like Telegram, Signal,
and WhatsApp have become enormously popular in recent
years. Recent studies estimate that over 2 billion people use
mobile IM applications across the world [42]. IM services
enable users to form private and public social groups and
exchange messages of various types, including text messages,
images, videos, and audio files. In particular, IM applications
are used extensively to exchange politically and socially sen-
sitive content. As a result, governments and corporations in-
creasingly monitor the communications made through popular
IM services [1], [2], [73], [85].
A notable example of oppressed IM services is Tele-
gram [83] with over 200 million users globally [61], where
a large fraction of its users come from countries with strict
media regulations like Iran and Russia. In particular, Telegram
is so popular in Iran that it has been estimated to consume more
than 60 percent of Iran’s Internet bandwidth [9]. Consequently,
Iranian officials have taken various measures to monitor and
block Telegram: from requesting Telegram to host some of its
servers inside Iran to enable surveillance [85], to requesting
Telegram to remove controversial political and non-political
channels [85]. Eventually, Iran blocked Telegram entirely in
April 2018 due to Telegram’s non-compliance. Despite this,
statistics suggest only a small decrease in Telegram’s Iranian
users who connect to it through various kinds of VPNs [43].
Telegram has also been blocked in Russia as Telegram op-
erators refrained from handing over their encryption keys to
Russian officials for surveillance [73]. Finally, in the light of
Telegram’s crucial role in recent Hong Kong protests, there
are unconfirmed reports [22], [75] that mainland Chinese and
Hong Kong authorities may have attempted to discover Hong
Kong protesters by misusing a Telegram feature that enabled
them to map phone numbers to Telegram IDs.
A Fundamental Vulnerability: Popular IM applications like
Telegram, WhatsApp, and Signal deploy encryption (either
end-to-end or end-to-middle) to secure user communications.
We refer to such services as secure IM (SIM) applications. In
this paper, we demonstrate that despite their use of advanced
encryption, popular IM applications leak sensitive information
about their clients’ activities to surveillance parties. Specif-
ically, we demonstrate that surveillance parties are capable
of identifying members as well as administrators1 of target
IM communications (e.g., politically sensitive IM channels)
with very high accuracies, and by only using low-cost traffic
analysis techniques. Note that our attacks are not due to
security flaws or buggy software implementations such as those
discovered previously [32], [49], [74], [94]; while important,
such security flaws are scarce, and are immediately fixed by
IM providers once discovered. Instead, our attacks enable
surveillance by merely watching encrypted IM traffic of IM
users, and assuming that the underlying IM software is entirely
secure. The key enabler of our attacks is the fact that major
IM operators do not deploy any mechanisms to obfuscate
traffic characteristics (e.g., packet timing and sizes), due to
the impact of obfuscation on the usability and performance of
1An administrator of an IM channel is a member who is privileged to post
messages to that channel.
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such services. We therefore argue that our attacks demonstrate
a fundamental vulnerability in major in-the-wild IM services,
and, as we will demonstrate, they work against all major IM
services.
We believe that our attacks present significant real-world
threats to the users of believed-to-be-secure IM services,
specially given escalating attempts by oppressive regimes to
crack down on such services, e.g., the recent attempts [1], [2],
[22], [75] to identify and seize the administrators and members
of controversial IM communications.
Our Contributions: We design traffic analysis attack algo-
rithms for SIM communications; the objective of our attack
is to identify the admins and/or members of target SIM
communications. What enables our attack is that, widely-used
SIM services do not employ any mechanisms to obfuscate
statistical characteristics of their communications.
We start by establishing a statistical model for IM traffic
characteristics. Such a model is essential in our search for
effective traffic analysis attacks on SIM services. To model IM
communications, we join over 1,000 public Telegram channels
and record their communications, based on which we derive
a statistical model for IM traffic features. We use our SIM
model to derive theoretical bounds on the effectiveness of our
traffic analysis algorithms; we also use our statistical model
to generate arbitrary numbers of synthetic SIM channels to
enhance the confidence of our empirical evaluations.
Based on our statistical model for IM communications, we
use hypothesis testing [68] to systematically design effective
traffic analysis attack algorithms. Specifically, we design two
traffic analysis attack algorithms; our first algorithm, which we
call the event-based correlator, relies on the statistical model
that we derive for SIM communications to offer an optimal
matching of users to channels. Our second algorithm, which
we call the shape-based algorithm, correlates the shapes of
SIM traffic flows in order to match users to target channels.
Our shape-based algorithm is slower but offers more accu-
rate detection performance than the event-based algorithm.
In practice, the adversary can cascade the two algorithms to
optimize computation cost (and scalability) versus detection
performance. Note that, as demonstrated through experiments,
our statistical detectors outperform deep learning based detec-
tors trained on IM traffic. This is because, as also demonstrated
in recent work [58], deep learning traffic classifiers outperform
statistical classifiers only in network applications with non-
stationary noise conditions (e.g., Tor), where statistical models
becomes unreliable.
We perform extensive experiments on live and synthetic
SIM traffic to evaluate the performance of our attacks. We
demonstrate that our algorithms offer extremely high accura-
cies in disclosing the participants of target SIM communica-
tions. In particular, we show that only 15 minutes of Telegram
traffic suffices for our shape-based detector to identify the
admin of a target SIM channel with a 94% accuracy and a 10−3
false positive rate—the adversary can reduce the false positive
to 5× 10−5 by observing an hour of traffic (the adversary can
do this hierarchically, e.g., by monitoring the users flagged
using 15 min of traffic for longer traffic intervals).
We also study the use of standard traffic analysis counter-
measures against our attacks. In particular, we investigate tun-
neling SIM traffic through VPNs, mixing it with background
traffic, adding cover IM traffic, and delaying IM packets. As
expected, our experiments show that such countermeasures
reduce the effectiveness of the attacks at the cost of additional
communication overhead as well as increased latency for SIM
communications. For instance, we find that tunneling SIM
traffic through VPN and mixing it with background web-
browsing traffic reduces the accuracy of our attack from
93% to 70%, and adding cover traffic with a 17% overhead
drops the accuracy to 62%. We argue that since many SIM
users do not deploy such third-party countermeasures due
to usability reasons, SIM providers should integrate standard
traffic obfuscation techniques into their software to protect
their users against the introduced traffic analysis attacks. In
the meantime, we have designed and deployed an open-source,
publicly available countermeasure system, called IMProxy,
that can be used by IM clients with no need to any support
from IM providers. We have demonstrated the effectiveness of
IMProxy through experiments.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We introduce traffic analysis attacks that reliably identify
users involved in sensitive communications through se-
cure IM services. To launch our attacks, the adversary
does not need cooperate with IM providers, nor does
he need to leverage any security flaws of the target IM
services.
• We establish a statistical model for regular IM commu-
nications by analyzing IM traffic from a large number of
real-world IM channels.
• We perform extensive experiments on the popular IM ser-
vices of Telegram, WhatsApp, and Signal to demonstrate
the in-the-wild effectiveness of our attacks.
• We study potential countermeasures against our attacks.
In particular, we design and deploy IMProxy, which is an
open-source, publicly available countermeasure system.
IMProxy works for all major IM services, with no need
to any support from IM providers.
II. BACKGROUND: SECURE INSTANT MESSAGING (SIM)
APPLICATIONS
We define a secure IM (SIM) service to be an instant
messaging service that satisfies two properties: (1) it deploys
strong encryption on its user communications (either end-to-
end or end-to-middle), and (2) it is not controlled or operated
by an adversary, e.g., a government. While our attacks also
apply to non-secure IM applications, an adversary can use
other trivial techniques to compromise privacy of non-secure
IM services. For instance, if the operator of an IM service fully
cooperates with a surveillant government, e.g., the WeChat
IM service in China or the Soroush service in Iran, the IM
provider can let the adversary identify target users with no
need for traffic analysis mechanisms. Similarly, an IM service
with weak encryption can be trivially eavesdropped with no
need for sophisticated traffic analysis attacks.
Table I overviews some of the most popular SIM services.
A. How SIM Services Operate
Architecture: All major IM services are centralized, as shown
in Table I. Therefore, all user communications in such services
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TABLE I: Popular IM services [79]
IM Service Monthly Users Main Servers Hosted in Owned by End-to-End Encryption Centralized
WhatsApp 1300 M United States Facebook X X
Facebook Messenger 1300 M United States Facebook X(Secret Communications) X
WeChat 980 M China Tencent 7 X
QQ Mobile 843 M China Tencent X X
Skype 300 M Estonia Microsoft X X
Viber 260 M Luxembourg Rakuten XSince 2016 X
Snapchat 255 M United States Snap Inc 7 X
LINE 203 M Japan Line Corporation X X
Telegram 200 M UAE Telegram Messenger LLP X(Secret Chats) X
Signal 10 M United States Open Whisper Systems X X
are exchanged through servers hosted by the IM provider
companies, e.g., Telegram Messenger LLP (note that some
less popular services use a peer-to-peer architecture, e.g.,
FireChat [80], Ring [72], and Briar [15]). Each IM service
has a server for authentication and key exchange. A database
server stores message contents and other user information
(possibly encrypted with client keys). Some IMs use Content
Delivery Networks (CDNs) to run their databases to improve
quality of service and resist attacks. Existing IM services
use various messaging protocols for user communications,
including Signal [31], Matrix [8], MTProto [55], and Off-the-
Record [14]. Each of these protocols involves several stages
including authentication, key exchange, message transmission,
re-keying, and MAC key publishing [44].
Popular IM services intermediate all user communica-
tions by having user traffic go through their servers. Such
a centralized architecture allows IM providers to offer high
quality of services and solves critical issues like reaching to
offline clients and clients behind NAT/firewalls. However, this
presents different privacy threats to the users, as IM servers are
involved in all user communications. Some IM services deploy
end-to-end encryption to alleviate this, as presented below.
Security Features: IM services use standard authentication
mechanisms like authorization keys and public key certificates
to authenticate IM servers and peers [11], [12]. Also, they
use standard techniques to ensure the integrity of messages.
All major IM services encrypt user communications to protect
confidentiality [34]. Some IM providers additionally deploy
end-to-end encryption on user communications. This prevents
IM operators from seeing the content of communications;
however, they can still see communication metadata, e.g.,
who is talking to whom and when. WhatsApp, Skype, Line,
as well as Telegram and Facebook Messenger offer end-to-
end encryption, while WeChat, Snapchat, and the BlackBerry
Messenger do not.
Also, several major IM providers, including WhatsApp,
Viber, Signal, and Facebook Messenger, provide perfect for-
ward secrecy by using short-term session keys for user commu-
nications [44]. Please refer to Johansen et al. [44] for further
discussion of other IM security features.
B. Prior Security Studies of IM Services
Metadata leakage: Coull and Dyer [23] are the first to apply
traffic analysis on messaging applications. They demonstrate
traffic analysis attacks that can infer various meta-data of a
target Apple iMessage user, specifically, the operating system
version, type of the IM action, and, to some degree, the
language of conversations. More recently, Park and Kim [67]
perform traffic analysis on the Korean KakaoTalk IM service,
to identify users’ online activities using basic classification
algorithms. Our work is differ from these works in that
the design of our detectors rely on theoretical foundations
and meticulous modeling of IM communications. Also, we
believe that our attacks are able to reveal IM meta-data that
is more sensitive than what was identified by prior works.
We demonstrate the applicability of our attacks on several IM
services, and design and evaluate tailored countermeasures.
Security vulnerabilities: Johansen et al. [44] surveyed
different implementations of SIM protocols such as Signal,
WhatsApp, and Threema, and evaluated their security and
usability; they conclude that none of the studied applications
are infallible. Unger et al. [87] performed a comprehensive
study of instant messaging protocols focused on their security
properties around trust establishment, conversation security,
and transport privacy. Also, Aggarwal et al. [3] study the
implementation of encryption in widely-used messaging ap-
plications.
Furthermore, there have been various identity enumeration
attacks on messaging applications. In particular, as some IM
services use SMS text message to activate new devices, an
adversarial phone company can initiate and intercept such
authorization codes to either identify users or access their
accounts. Alternatively, unconfirmed reports [22] suggest that
mainland Chinese and Hong Kong authorities may have at-
tempted to discover Hong Kong protesters by misusing a
Telegram feature that allowed one to discover the Telegram
IDs of phone contacts (therefore, mapping phone numbers to
their Telegram IDs); Telegram has promised to fix this issue
through an update that will allow users to cloak their phone
numbers [75].
Alternatively, Schliep et al. [76] evaluate the security
of the Signal protocol against Signal servers. They identify
vulnerabilities that allow the Signal server to learn the contents
of attachments, re-order and drop messages, and add/drop
participants from group conversations. Note that their study
targets an entirely different adversary than ours, i.e., their
adversary is a compromised/malicious Signal server, whereas
in our case the adversary is any third-party who is able to
wiretap encrypted IM traffic. Also, their attacks only work
against Signal, whereas our attacks apply to all major IM
services as they rely on fundamental communication behavior
of IM services.
Communication privacy: The centralized nature of popular
SIM services makes them susceptible to various privacy issues.
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First, all user communications, including group communica-
tions and one-on-one communications, are established with the
help of the servers run by the SIM providers; therefore, SIM
providers have access to the metadata of all communications,
i.e., who is talking to whom, and channel ownership and
membership relationships. Recent works suggest using various
cryptographic techniques, such as private set intersection, to
protect privacy against the central operators, e.g., for contact
discovery [47]. Second, even if an IM service provider is
not malicious, its servers may be compromised by malicious
adversaries [30] or subpoenaed by governments, therefore
putting client communication metadata at risk.
In traditional SIM services, user communications are en-
crypted end-to-middle, i.e., between clients and SIM servers.
In such services, the SIM providers can see not only the
users’ communication metadata but also their communica-
tion contents. Recently, major SIM providers such as Signal
and WhatsApp have started to support end-to-end encryp-
tion, therefore protecting communication content from SIM
providers. Poor/buggy implementations of some SIM services
have resulted in various security flaws and meta-data leak-
age threats despite their use of end-to-end encryption [32],
[49], [60], [74], [94], e.g., through on/off notifications in
Telegram [32] and the recent WhatsApp vulnerability giving
remote access to the hackers [94].
Censorship: The centralized architecture of popular SIM
services makes their censorship trivial: censors can easily
blacklist a handful of IP addresses or DNS records to block
all communications to a target SIM service. A straightforward
countermeasure to unblock censored SIM services is to use
standard circumvention systems like VPNs [88] and Tor [27].
Alternatively, major SIM services allow the use of circumven-
tion proxies to evade blocking, e.g., as built into the recent
versions of the Telegram software after censorship attempts
by Iranian and Russian authorities.
III. ATTACK AND THREAT MODEL
In this work, we demonstrate a fundamental attack on IM
services: our attacks are applicable to all major IM services,
and are not due to buggy software implementations that can be
fixed through software updates, as overviewed in Section II-B.
Our attacks are performed by an adversary who merely per-
forms traffic analysis. In this setting, the attacker does not need
to compromise or coerce the SIM provider, nor does she need
to block the target IM service entirely. Instead, the adversary
performs traffic analysis to identify the participants of target
IM communications in order to either punish the identified IM
participants or selectively block the target communications. In
particular, the adversary can use traffic analysis to identify the
administrators of controversial political or social IM channels
and force them to shut down their channels (as seen in recent
incidents [1], [2]). Alternatively, the adversary can use our
traffic analysis attacks to identify the members of controversial
IM channels, and thereby selectively disrupt the access to the
target channels.
A. Introducing the Players
The adversary is a surveillance organization, e.g., an
intelligence agency run by a government. The goal of the
SIM Server
Target User (Admin)
Target User (Member)
Target User (Member)
Target User (Member)
Target User (Admin)
1
2
3
Adversary's Ground Truth
Adversary Watching
Adversary joins the target
channel as a member, and
records the channel's
messages.
Adversary joins the target
channel with posting privileges,
e.g., as an admin. She records
the channel's messages as well
as posts to the channel.
Adversary cannot join the target
channel, but she identifies a
member/admin, and wiretaps her
traffic.
Not
Observable
to Adversary
Fig. 1: Alternative attack scenarios
adversary is to identify (the IP addresses of) the members or
administrators (owners) of target IM conversations.
A target IM conversation can be a public IM channel (e.g.,
a chat room) on politically or socially sensitive topics, or a
private IM conversation between target users, e.g., dissidents
and journalists.
For the adversary to be able to conduct the attack, she
needs to be intercepting the (encrypted) network traffic of the
monitored IM users, e.g., by wiretapping the ISPs of the
monitored users. Therefore, considering the Great Firewall of
China as the adversary, she can only perform the attack on the
IM users residing inside China.
B. Threat Model
We assume that the hosting IM service is a secure IM (SIM)
service, as defined in Section II. Therefore, the adversary does
not leverage any security vulnerabilities of the target SIM
service in performing the attack. For instance, the SIM system
does not leak the IP addresses (or other sensitive meta-data) of
its clients to the adversary. Also, we assume all traffic between
IM clients and the IM servers to be encrypted with strong
encryption. Finally, the operators of the SIM service do not
cooperate with the adversary in identifying target members.
C. How the Attack Is Performed
Figure 1 illustrates the setup of the attack. Suppose that the
adversary aims at identifying the members/admins of a specific
IM channel, C.
Adversary’s ground truth: For any target channel C, the
attacker needs to obtain some ground truth about the traffic of
the channel. This can be done in three ways:
(1) If C is an open (public) channel, the adversary joins the
channel (as a member) and records the messages sent on
C along with their metadata (e.g., time and size of the
messages).
(2) The adversary has joined C and is capable of posting
messages to C. This can happen if C a closed group that
gives every member the capability to post messages, or
this could be because the adversary has gained an admin
role for C (e.g., the surveillance adversary has created a
channel on a politically sensitive topic to identify target
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journalists, or the adversary has arrested the owner of the
sensitive channel and is misusing her account). In this
setting, not only the adversary can record the messages
posted to C, but also he can post his own messages to C
with his desired (distinct) traffic patterns.
(3) The adversary is not able to join C as a member/admin,
but he has identified (the IP address of) one of the mem-
bers/admins of C. The adversary wiretaps the (encrypted)
network traffic of the identified member and records the
traffic patterns of the identified member.
Adversary’s wiretap: The adversary monitors the (encrypted)
network traffic of IM users to identify (the IP addresses of)
the members/admins of the target IM channel C. This can be
performed by the adversary wiretapping the network traffic of
the ISPs or IXPs he is controlling, e.g., by the Great Firewall
of China. Alternatively, the adversary can wiretap the network
traffic of specific individuals (e.g., suspected activists), perhaps
after obtaining a wiretapping warrant.
Adversary makes decisions: The adversary uses a detection
algorithm (as introduced in Section V) to match the traffic
patterns of the wiretapped users to the ground truth traffic
patterns of the target channel C.
D. Related Traffic Analysis Attacks
Prior work has studied various kinds of traffic analysis
attacks in different contexts.
Flow correlation In this setting, the adversary tries to link
obfuscated network flows by correlating their traffic charac-
teristics, i.e., packet timings and sizes [25], [28], [37], [51],
[59], [78], [93], [98]. Flow correlation has particularly been
studied as an attack on anonymity systems like Tor [7], [57],
[70], [91], [99]: the adversary can link the ingress and egress
segments of a Tor connection (say, observed by malicious Tor
guard and exit relays) by correlating the traffic characteristics
of the ingress and egress segments. Recently, Nasr et al. [58]
introduce a deep learning-based technique called DeepCorr
which learns a correlation function to match Tor flows, and
outperforms the previous statistical techniques in flow corre-
lation. Alternatively, flow correlation has been studied as a
defensive mechanism to detect stepping stone attackers [28],
[37].
Flow watermarking This is the active version of flow
correlation attacks described above. In flow watermarking, the
adversary encodes an imperceptible signal into traffic patterns
by applying slight perturbations to traffic features, e.g., by de-
laying packets [39], [40], [69], [92], [97]. Compared to regular
(passive) flow correlation techniques, flow watermarks offer
higher resistance to noise, but require real-time modification
of network traffic, and are subject to detection attacks.
Website fingerprinting In Website Fingerprinting (WF), the
adversary intercepts network connections of some monitored
users and tries to match the patterns of the intercepted con-
nections to a set of target webpages. This differs with flow
correlation in that flow correlation intercepts the two ends
of target connections. WF has particularly been studied as
an attack on Tor. Existing WF techniques leverage various
machine learning algorithms, such as k-NN, SVM, and deep
neural networks to design classifiers that match monitored
connections to target web pages [18], [35], [36], [38], [45],
[52], [64], [65], [71], [89].
Intersection Attacks Intersection attacks [4], [26], [28], [48]
try to compromise anonymous communications by matching
users’ activity/inactivity time periods. For instance, Kesdogan
et al. [48] model an anonymity system as an abstract threshold
mix and propose the disclosure attack whose goal is to learn
the potential recipients for any target sender. Danezis et al. [24]
make the attack computationally more practical by proposing
a statistical version of the attack.
Side channel attacks Another class of traffic analysis attacks
aims at leaking sensitive information from encrypted network
traffic of Internet services [6], [10], [13], [19], [33], [77], [82],
[95]. For instance, Chang et al. [19] infer speech activity from
encrypted Skype traffic, Chen et al. [20] demonstrate how
online services leak sensitive client activities, and Schuster et
al. [77] identify encrypted video streams.
Our Traffic Analysis Direction: Our attacks presented in this
paper are closest in nature to the scenario of flow correlation
techniques. Similar to the flow correlation setting, in our
scenario the adversary intercepts a live target flow (e.g., by
joining a controversial IM channel), and tries to match it
to the traffic patterns of flows monitored in other parts of
the network (to be able to identify the IP addresses of the
members or admins of the target channel). However, we can
not trivially apply existing flow correlation techniques to the
IM scenario, since the traffic models and communication noise
are entirely different in the IM scenario. We, therefore, design
flow correlation algorithms tailored to the specific scenario of
IM applications. To do so, we first model traffic and noise
behavior in IM services, based on which we design tailored
flow correlation algorithms for our specific scenario.
Note that one could alternatively use techniques from the
intersection attacks literature to design traffic analysis attacks
for IM services. However, flow correlation is significantly more
powerful than intersection attacks, as flow correlation leverages
not just the online/offline behavior of the users, but also the
patterns of their communications when they are online. Also,
typical IM clients tend to remain online for very long time
intervals. Therefore, we expect attacks based on intersection to
be significantly less reliable (or require very long observations
to achieve comparable reliability) when compared to our flow
correlation-based attacks.
IV. CHARACTERIZING IM COMMUNICATIONS
We start by characterizing IM traffic and deriving a statis-
tical model for it. We will use our model to find analytical
bounds for the attack algorithms we design, as well as to
generate synthetic IM traffic to be used in some of our
experiments.
A. Main IM Messages
IM services allow their users to send different types of
messages, most commonly text, image, video, file, and audio
messages. IM messages are communicated between users
through one of the following major communication forms:
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• Direct messages are the one-on-one communications
between IM users. As mentioned earlier, popular IM
services are centralized, therefore all direct messages are
relayed through the servers of the IM providers, and
unless end-to-end encryption is deployed, the servers can
see communication contents.
• Private (Closed) Group Communications are commu-
nications that happen between multiple users. In groups,
every member can post messages and read the messages
posted by others. Each group has an administrator mem-
ber who created the group and has the ability to manage
the users and messages. An invitation is needed for a user
to join a closed group.
• Public (Open) Group Communications which are also
called channels, are a broadcast form of communication in
which one or multiple administrators can post messages,
and the members can only read these posts. Users can
join channels with no need for an invitation.
Note that some IM services offer other forms of communi-
cations, like status messages, that are not relevant to the attacks
discussed in our work.
B. Data Collection
In this paper, we collect the bulk of our IM data on
the Telegram messaging application. We choose Telegram for
two reasons; first, Telegram hosts a very large number of
public channels that we can join to collect actual IM traffic.
This is unlike other popular IM services where most group
communications are closed/private. The second reason for
choosing Telegram for data collection is that Telegram has
been at the center of recent censorship and governmental
surveillance attempts [1], [2], [84], [85], as it is home to a
multitude of politically and socially sensitive channels. Note
that our analysis and attacks are by no means specific to
Telegram, as we demonstrate for other messaging services.
We use Telegram’s API to collect the communications of
1,000 random channels with different message rates, each for
a 24-hours span. For every collected Telegram message, we
extract the channel ID it was sent over, its timestamp, the type
of message (text, photo, video, audio or file), and the message
size. Telegram has a limit of 50 on the number of new channels
a user can join every day. Therefore, we use multiple Telegram
accounts over several days to perform our data collection (also
note that each Telegram account needs to be tied to an actual
mobile phone number, limiting the number of accounts one
can create).
Although we choose Telegram for collecting SIM traffic,
we note that our attack algorithms perform similarly on other
SIMs like WhatsApp and Signal. This is because none of
these services implement traffic obfuscation, and therefore the
shape of their traffic is similar across different IMs. We have
illustrated this in Figure 2, where the same stream of messages
are sent over four different SIM services. As can be seen, the
same messages result in similar traffic patterns across different
IM services.
C. Modeling IM Communications
We derive statistical models for IM communications based
on our collected IM traffic. We model two key features of
TABLE II: Distribution of various message types
Type Count Volume (MB) Size range Avg. size
Text 12539 (29.4%) 3.85 (0.016%) 1B-4095B 306.61B
Photo 20471 (48%) 1869.57 (0.765%) 2.40Kb-378.68Kb 91.33KB
Video 6564 (15.4%) 232955.19 (95.3%) 10.16Kb-1.56Gb 35.49MB
File 903 (2.1%) 47.46 (0.019%) 2.54Kb-1.88Mg 52.56KB
Audio 2161 (5.1%) 9587.36 (3.92%) 2.83Kb-98.07Mg 4.44MB
IM traffic: inter-message delays (IMDs) and message sizes.
We also model the communication latency of IM traffic. We
use Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) [63] to fit the best
probability distribution for each of these features.
Inter-Message Delays (IMDs): The IMD feature is the time
delay between consecutive IM messages in an IM commu-
nication. In our model, we merge messages sent with very
small IMDs (specifically, messages separated by less than a
threshold, te seconds). We do this because such extremely
close messages create a combined traffic burst in the encrypted
IM traffic that cannot be separated by the traffic analysis
adversary. Such close messages appear (infrequently) when an
administrator forwards a batch of IM messages from another
group. We also filter out the very long IMDs that correspond
to long late-night inactivity periods.
We show that the probability density function of IMDs can
be closely fitted to an exponential distribution using our MLE
algorithm; Figure 3 shows the probability density function
of IMDs for 200 IM channels with a message rate of 130
messages per day. We interpret the exponential behavior of
the IMDs to be due to the fact that messages (or message
batches) are sent independently in the channels (note that this
will be different for interactive one-on-one chats).
Also, we consider IMDs to be independent of the type
and size of messages, since in practice there is no correlation
between the time a message is sent and its type or size.
Messages Sizes: Table II shows the size statistics and fre-
quencies of the five main message types in our collected IM
messages. We use these empirical statistics to create a five-state
Markov chain, shown in Figure 6, to model the sizes of the
messages sent in an IM communication stream. We obtain the
empirical transition probability matrix of this Markov model
for the aggregation of all channels, as well as for groups
of channels with similar rates; the matrices are presented in
Appendix D. We see that the transition matrices change slightly
for IM channels with different daily message rates.
Finally, Figure 4 shows the Complementary Cumulative
Density Function (CCDF) of the normalized message sizes
for different message types (the sizes are normalized by the
maximum message size of each category). We observe that
different message types are characterized by different message
size distributions.
Communication Latency: IM messages are delayed in transit
due to two reasons: network latency and the IM servers’
processing latency. To measure such latencies, we collect IM
traffic from 500 channels, each for one hour (therefore, 500
hours worth of IM traffic) using Telegram’s API. We then set
up two IM clients, and send the collected IM traffic between
the two clients to measure the incurred communication laten-
cies. Using MLE, we find that transition latencies fit best to
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Fig. 2: Comparing the shape of traffic on four major SIM services; by sending the same sequence of IM messages, we observe
similar traffic bursts regardless of the service provider.
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a Laplacian distribution fµ,b(x), where µ is the average and
2b2 is the variance of the delay. Since network delay cannot
be negative, we consider only the positive parts of the Laplace
distribution. Figure 5 shows a Quantile-Quantile (Q-Q) plot of
the packet latencies against the best Laplace distribution.
D. Synthesizing SIM Traffic
We can use our empirical model, described above, to create
synthetic IM communications. A synthetic IM communication
trace consists of IM messages with specific sizes, timings,
and message types. Such synthetic traffic allows us to validate
our experimental results using much more traffic samples than
what can be collected online.
The sketch of our algorithm in presented in Algorithm 1.
The inputs of the algorithm are λ, the rate of messages (per
day) for the channel to be synthesized, and T , the length of
the synthesized channel. First, the algorithm uses the empirical
distribution of IMDs (shown in Figure 3) to create a sequence
of IM message timings. Then, our algorithm uses our Markov
model for message types to assign a type to each of the
messages in the sequence (Section IV-C). Finally, for each
message, our algorithm finds its size using the empirical
distribution of sizes for the corresponding type of the message
(i.e., from Figure 4). The output of the algorithm is a sequence
of IM messages, where each message has a timestamp, a size,
and a message type.
Later in Section VI-E we show that our detectors provide
comparable performances on synthetic and real-world IM
traces (for similar settings), demonstrating the realisticity of
our synthetic traces. Since our traffic synthesizing algorithm
uses sample IM traces to generate synthetic IM traffic patterns,
the quality of its synthesized traffic improves by increasing
the size of its training dataset. Alternatively, one could train a
generative adversarial network to produce synthetic IM traces;
we leave this to future work.
V. DETAILS OF ATTACK ALGORITHMS
We design two algorithms for performing our attack (i.e.,
to map monitored IM users to their channels). As discussed
in Section III-D, our attack scenario is closest in nature
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm for Generating Synthetic IM Traffic
1: procedure GENERATESYNTHETICTRAFFIC
2: P← transition matrix based on λ
3: current length← 0
4: message sequence← ∅
5: while current length < T do
6: event← ∅
7: t← A random time from IMD
8: empirical distribution
9: current length← current length + t
10: event← event + {t}
11: message sequence← message sequence + {event}
12: for each event in message sequence do
13: event← event + {message type} based on P
14: size← A random size from the corresponding
15: message type empirical distribution
16: event← event + {size}
17: return message sequence
to the scenario of flow correlation attacks. Therefore, the
design of our attacks is inspired by existing work on flow
correlation. Prior flow correlation techniques use standard
statistical metrics, such as mutual information [21], [100],
Pearson correlation [50], [78], Cosine Similarity [41], [59],
and the Spearman Correlation [81], to link network flows
by correlating their vectors of packet timing and sizes. We
use hypothesis testing [68],2 similar to state-of-the-art flow
correlation works [40], [41], to design optimal traffic analysis
algorithms for the particular setting of IM communications. In
contrast to flow correlation studies which use the features of
network packets, we use the features (timing and sizes) of IM
messages for detection.
Note that, the recent work of DeepCorr [58] uses a
deep learning classifier to perform flow correlation attacks
on Tor. They demonstrate that their deep learning classifier
outperforms statistical correlation techniques in linking Tor
connections. In Section VI-D, we compare our statistical
classifiers with a DeepCorr-based classifier tailored to IM
traffic. As we will show, our statistical classifiers outperform
such deep learning based classifiers, especially for shorter flow
observations. Intuitively, this is due to the sparsity of events in
typical IM communications, as well as the stationary nature of
noise in IM communications in contrast to the scenario of Tor.
Note that this fully complies with Nasr et al. [58]’s observation
that DeepCorr only outperforms statistical classifiers in non-
stationary noisy conditions, where statistical traffic models
become inaccurate.
Our hypothesis testing: Consider C to be a target SIM
channel (e.g., a public group on a politically sensitive topic).
For each IM user, U , the attacker aims at deciding which of
the following hypotheses is true:
• H0: User U is not associated with the target channel
C, i.e., she is neither a member nor an administrator of
channel C.
2Our approach is “threshold testing” by some of the more strict definitions,
however, we will use the term “hypothesis testing” in this paper as threshold
testing falls into the general class of statistical hypothesis tests [68].
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• H1: User U is associated with the target channel C, i.e.,
she is posting messages to that channel as an admin, or
is a member of that channel and therefore receives the
channel’s messages.
As described in our threat model (Section III), the adver-
sary can only observe encrypted SIM communications between
users and SIM servers. Therefore, we design detectors that use
traffic features, i.e., IMDs and message sizes. In the following,
we describe two detector algorithms.
A. Event-Based Detector
Our first detector, the Event-Based Detector, aims at match-
ing SIM events in a target user’s traffic to those of the target
channel C. An event e = (t, s) is a single SIM message or a
batch of SIM messages sent with IMDs less than a threshold
te (as introduced earlier). Each single SIM message can be
one of the five types of image, video, file, text, or audio. t
is the time that e appeared on the SIM communication (e.g.,
sent to the public channel), and s is the size of e. Note that
an SIM communication can include SIM protocol messages as
well (handshakes, notifications, updates, etc.); however, such
messages are comparatively very small as shown in Figure 8,
and thus the detector ignores them in the correlation process.
Recall that the adversary is not able to see plaintext events in
the user’s traffic due to encryption. Therefore, the first stage of
our event-based detector is to extract events based on the user’s
encrypted SIM traffic shape. Figure 7 depicts the components
of our event-based detector.
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Fig. 8: Event extraction: IM Messages sent/received by a target user
create bursts of (encrypted) packets; the adversary can extract events
from packet bursts.
Event Extraction: Each SIM event, e.g., a sent image,
produces a burst of MTU-sized packets in the encrypted
traffic, i.e., packets with very small inter-packet delays. This
is illustrated in Figure 8: SIM events such as images appear
as traffic bursts, and scattered packets of small size are SIM
protocol messages like notifications, handshakes, updates, etc.
Therefore, the adversary can extract SIM events by looking
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for bursts of MTU-sized packets, even though she cannot see
packet contents due to encryption. We use the IPD threshold
te to identify bursts. Any two packets with distance less than
te are considered to be part of the same burst. Note that te is a
hyper-parameter of our model and we discuss its choice later in
the paper. For each burst, the adversary extracts a SIM event,
where the arrival time of the last packet in the burst gives the
arrival time of the event, and the sum of all packet sizes in
the burst gives the size of the event. Two SIM messages sent
with an IMD less than te are extracted as one event. Similarly,
the adversary combines events closer than te when capturing
them from the target channel.
Forming Hypotheses: We call a one-sided SIM communica-
tion a SIM flow. Therefore, a flow either consists of the packets
sent by a user to an SIM server, or the packets received by the
user from the SIM server. We represent a flow with n events
as f = {e1, e2, . . . , en}, where ei = (ti, si) is the ith event.
Consider a user U and a target channel C. Suppose that
the adversary has extracted flow f (U) = {e(U)1 , e(U)2 , . . . , e(U)n }
for user U (through wiretapping), and flow f (C) =
{e(C)1 , e(C)2 , . . . , e(C)n } for the target channel C (using her
ground truth). The detector aims at deciding whether user U
is an administrator or member of the channel. We can re-state
the adversary’s hypotheses presented earlier in this section as
follows:
• H0: User U is not an administrator or member of the
target channel; hence, f (C) and f (U) are independent.
• H1: User U is an administrator or member of the target
channel C; therefore, the user flow f (U) is a noisy version
of the channel flow f (C).
Therefore, we have3{
H0 : t
(C)
i = t
(∗)
i + d
(∗)
i , s
(C)
i = s
(∗)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n
H1 : t
(C)
i = t
(U)
i + d
(U)
i , s
(C)
i = s
(U)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n
where f (∗) = {e(∗)1 , e(∗)2 , . . . , e(∗)n } is the flow of a user U ′ 6=
U who is not an administrator/member of channel C. Also,
d
(·)
i is the latency applied to the timing of the ith event. Note
that IM message sizes do not change drastically in transit, and
the order of messages remains the same after transmission.
Detection Algorithm: The adversary counts the number of
event matches between the user flow f (U) and the channel
flow f (C). We say that the ith channel event e(C)i matches
some event e(U)j in f
(U) if:
• e(C)i and e(U)j have close timing: |t(C)i − t(U)j | < ∆; and
• e(C)i and e(U)j have close sizes: |s(C)i − s(U)j | < Γ.
where ∆ and Γ are thresholds discussed in Section VI-A. Note
that even though the sizes of SIM messages do not change in
transmission, the event extraction algorithm introduced earlier
may impose size modifications, as network jitter is able to
divide/merge event bursts (i.e., a burst can be divided into two
3Note that the above hypothesis is for the case that the adversary is looking
for the “administrator” of channel C. For the case that the adversary is looking
for the “members” of the target channel, the hypothesis changes slightly by
replacing t(C)i = t
(U)
i + d
(U)
i with t
(U)
i = t
(C)
i + d
(C)
i . As the derivations
will be exactly the same, we exclude it without loss of generality.
bursts due to network jitter or two bursts can be combined due
to the small bandwidth of the user).
Finally, the adversary calculates the ratio of the matched
events as r = k/n, where k is number of matched events and n
is the total number of events in the target channel. The detector
decides the hypothesis by comparing to a threshold: r = kn
H1
≷
H0
η. The detection threshold η is discussed in Section VI-B.
Analytical Bounds: We first derive an upper-bound on the
probability of false positive (PFP), i.e., the probability that
H1 is detected when H0 is true (Type I error). Let p0 be the
probability that a message with size s(C)i and time t
(C)
i matches
an event in f (U) when H0 is true, i.e., there exists only one
message whose time t(∗)j satisfies t
(C)
i ≤ t(∗)j ≤ t(C)i + ∆
and has the same size label as s(C)i . From our observations,
p0 = 0.002. This Type I error occurs if more than η ·n events
in f (C) match f (U), when H0 is true. This is equivalent to the
case that less than n− η ·n events in f (C) do not match f (U)
when H0 is true. Consequently,
PFP = P(k ≥ ηn | H0) = P(n− k ≤ n− ηn | H0),
= F (n− ηn;n, 1− p0),
≤
(
1− η
p0
)−n+nηη (
η
1− p0
)−nη
,
(1)
where F (r;m, p) = P(X ≤ r) is the cumulative density
function of a Binomial distribution with parameters m, p, and
the last step follows from the following inequality which is
tight when p is close to zero [5]:
F (r;m, p) ≤
(
r/p
p
)−k (
1− r/m
1− p
)k−m
(2)
Next, we upper-bound the probability of false negatives
(PFN ), i.e., the probability that H0 is detected when H1 is
true, which occurs when less than k messages of f (C) match
f (U). Let p1 be the probability of the case that an event of
f (C) matches f (U) when H1 is true (Type II error).
Even though we mentioned earlier in this section that when
H1 is true, a delayed version of each event of f (U) appears in
f (C), the bandwidth of the target user can affect the burst
extraction process. As explained earlier in this section, we
merge bursts of packets for messages whose IMD is less than
te. Hence, suppose that the time it takes for the user to send a
message is large enough to make the IMD between the current
message and the next one less than te. Therefore, these two
consecutive messages are combined in one burst. Table III
shows the value of p1 observed from our data for different
bandwidths. Since the bandwidth of our experiments is 1Mbps,
p1 = 0.921.
Note that Type II error occurs when less than η·n messages
of f (C) match f (U) when H1 is true. Therefore,
PFN = P (k ≤ ηn|H1) = F (ηn;n, p1)
≤
(
η
p1
)−nη (
1− η
1− p1
)ηn−n
, (3)
where the last step follows from (2).
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TABLE III: The empirical value of p1 measured for different client
bandwidths
Client Bandwidth (Mbps) p1
0.1 0.824
0.5 0.902
1 0.921
10 0.974
100 0.983
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Fig. 9: Shape-based detector
We will validate the upper-bounds of PFP and PFN with
our live experiments (Section VI-B) and simulation results
(Section VI-E).
B. Shape-Based Detector
We design a second detector called the shape-based de-
tector. This detector links users to SIM communications by
correlating the shape of their network traffic, where traffic
shape refers to the vector of packet lengths over time. Figure 9
illustrates the four stages of the shape-based detector.
Event Extraction: The first stage of the shape-based detec-
tor is to extract SIM events from network traffic, which is
performed similar to what was described earlier for the event-
based detector. As described in the following, we do this in
a way that accounts for the different bandwidths of the users
being correlated.
Normalizing Traffic Shapes: The shape-based detector con-
verts the extracted events into normalized traffic shapes by
replacing each event with a traffic bar. The reason for doing
so is that the shape of an IM event (e.g., the corresponding
packet burst) is a function of user network bandwidths; our
traffic normalization removes the impact of user bandwidth,
and therefore the adversary can correlate traffic shapes with
no knowledge of the underlying users’ bandwidths.
To perform this normalization, we replace each event (i.e.,
each burst) with a traffic bar whose width is 2 × te, where
te is the threshold used during event extraction as discussed
in section V-A. We choose this value to reduce the chances
of overlaps between consecutive bars. To capture the sizes
of events in traffic normalization, the height of each bar is
chosen such that the area under the bar equals the size of the
event. Our shape normalization also reduces correlation noise
by removing small traffic packets that are not part of any SIM
events.
To form the new normalized shape of traffic, we divide
each bar into smaller bins of width ts, the value of which
is discussed in Section VI-A, and with a height equal to the
height of the corresponding bar. Therefore each bar consists of
a number of bins of equal width and height. Furthermore, we
put bins with the same width ts and height 0 between these
bars. By doing so, after the traffic normalization, the new shape
of traffic will be the vector of heights of bins over time.
Correlating Normalized Traffic Shapes: Our shape-based
detector correlates the normalized shapes of two traffic streams
of target channel C and user U to decide if they are as-
sociated. Suppose that b(C) = {b(C)1 , b(C)2 , . . . , b(C)nC } and
b(U) = {b(U)1 , b(U)2 , . . . , b(U)nU } are the respective vectors of
heights of bins associated with the target channel and user
being tested, where nC and nU are the number of events
in target channel and user flows, respectively. We use the
following normalized correlation metric:
corr = 2×
∑n
i=1 b
(C)
i b
(U)
i∑n
i=1(b
(C)
i )
2 +
∑n
i=1(b
(U)
i )
2
(4)
where n = min(nC , nU ). Note that corr returns a value
between 0 and 1, which shows the similarity of the two
traffic shapes (1 shows the highest similarity). Finally, the
detector makes its decision by comparing corr to a threshold,
corr
H1
≷
H0
η, where η is the detection threshold.
VI. ATTACK EXPERIMENTS
A. General Setup
We design our experimental setup to perform our attacks
in the setting of Figure 1, and based on the threat model of
Section III. We use the first type of ground-truth in Figure 1
(adversary joins the target channel as a reading-only member),
which is more challenging for the adversary compared to the
second ground-truth, and similar in performance compared to
the third ground-truth mechanism. Specifically, we use two
SIM clients using different SIM accounts (e.g., Telegram ac-
counts) that are running IM software on two separate machines.
One of these IM clients is run by the adversary, and the other
one represents the target client. The adversary client joins
target channel C, (e.g., a public political Telegram channel)
and records the metadata of all the SIM communications of
C, i.e., the timing and sizes of all messages sent on that
channel. The target client may or may not be a member/admin
of the target channel C. The adversary is not able to see
the contents of the target client’s communications (due to
encryption), however she can capture the encrypted traffic
of the target client. The adversary then uses the detection
algorithms introduced in Section V to decide if the target user
is associated with the target channel C. In a real-world setting,
the adversary will possibly have multiple target channels, and
will monitor a large number of suspected clients.
For our Telegram and Signal experiments, our adversary-
controlled client uses their APIs to record SIM communica-
tions of target channels, while for WhatsApp, we manually
send messages through its Desktop version (as it does not have
an API).
Parameter Selection. We choose burst detection threshold as
te = 0.5s based on the empirical distribution of network jitter.
Also, we set ts of the shape-based detector to 0.01s, as it leaves
enough separation between two consecutive IM messages. We
set ∆ of the event-based algorithm to 3 seconds. We also set
Γ parameter of the event-based detector to 10Kb.
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Fig. 10: Attack correlation metrics for different traffic lengths.
The performance improves for longer observations.
Ethics. We performed our inference attacks only over public
IM channels; therefore, we did not capture any private IM
communications. Also, we performed our attacks only on our
own IM clients, but no real-world IM clients. Therefore, our
experiments did not compromise the privacy of any real-world
IM members or admins.
B. In-The-Wild Attacks on Telegram
We experiment our attacks on in-the-wild Telegram chan-
nels (fully complying with the ethical considerations of Sec-
tion VI-A).
Experimented Channels As discussed in Section IV-B, SIM
services put limits on the number of channels a client can join.
For our experiments, we joined 500 channels popular among
Iranian users, with different rates of daily messages. In our
experiments, each time our own client connects to one of these
500 channels, and the goal of the adversary is to match our
client to the channel she has joined.
Synchronization As the adversary’s clock may be skewed
across her vantage points, our adversary uses a simple sliding
window to mitigate this: for the first 10 seconds of traffic, the
adversary slides the two flows being compared with 0.5 second
steps, and uses the maximum correlation value.
Choosing the Threshold Figure 10 shows the TP and FP
rates of our experiments for different detection thresholds η,
and for different traffic lengths (traffic length excludes the long
inactivity periods across correlated connections). Each point in
the graph shows the average of the correlation metric across
all experiments, and the bars show the standard deviation.
Intuitively, the detector performs well for wider gaps between
the TP and FP bars. From the figures, we see the impact of the
traffic length on detection performance: longer observations
improve detection performance of our attacks. Also, η trades
off the TP and FP rates. The adversary can detect the right
threshold and the right traffic length based on her target TP
and FP values.
Comparing our Two Attacks: Figures 12 and 13 show
the performance of event-based and shape-based detectors,
respectively, for different detection thresholds using an ROC
curve (for 4 different observation lengths). We can see that, as
expected, longer traffic observations improve the accuracy of
both detectors. For instance, the shape-based detector offers
a TP = .94 and FP = 10−3 with 15 min observation,
TABLE IV: Comparing the runtimes of our two attacks.
Method One correlation time
Shape-based correlation 167µs
Event-based correlation 2µs
while an hour of observation reduces the FP to close to
FP = 5×10−5. In practice, an adversary can deploy the attack
with hierarchical observation intervals to optimize accuracy
and computation. For instance, the adversary can monitor
a mass of IM users for 15 mins of observation; then the
adversary will monitor only the clients detected with 15 mins
observations for longer time periods, e.g., an hour, to improve
the overall FP performance while keeping computations low.
Furthermore, as can be seen, the shape-based detector
outperforms the event-based detector for smaller values of
false positive rates. For instance, for a target true positive
rate of 0.9, the shape-based detector offers a false positive
of 5×10−4 compared to 8×10−4 of the event-based detector
(with 15 mins of observation). The performance gap decreases
for higher false positive rates. The reason for this performance
gap is the impact of event extraction noise on the event-based
detector. Such noise has smaller impact on the shape-based
detector as it correlates the shape of traffic flows.
On the other hand, our event-based detector is two orders
of magnitude faster than the shape-based detector. Table IV
compares the correlation times of the two detectors (averaged
over 100 experiments). The main reason for this difference
is that the event-based correlator uses the discrete time-series
of event metadata for its correlation, while the shape-based
detector uses traffic histograms over time.
Note that for our event-based detector in Figure 12, for
short traffic observations (e.g., 15 mins) we cannot observe
small FPs in our ROC curve. This is because the event-
based correlation uses the number of matched events, which
is very coarse-grained due to the limited number of events in
short (e.g., 15 minutes) intervals. We use our analytical upper-
bounds (derived in (1) and (3)) to estimate the performance
trend for smaller false positive values (Figure 22 of Appendix).
C. In-The-Wild Attacks on WhatsApp and Signal
As discussed previously in Section IV-B, we make the bulk
of our data collection and experiments on Telegram due to
its huge number of public channels (making our experiments
ethical and realistic as we do not need to do experiments on
private communications). However, as shown in Figure 2, the
shape of traffic is similar across different SIM services, and
therefore we expect our attack algorithms to perform similarly
when applied by an adversary on other SIM applications. We
validate this through experiments on Signal and WhatsApp
messengers.
Signal and WhatsApp only offer private (closed) channels.
For ethical reasons, we make our own (closed) channels on
these services to perform our experiments. Specifically, we
create a private channel on each of Signal and WhatsApp. We
send messages on these channels by mimicking the patterns
(i.e., inter-message times and message sizes) of randomly
chosen public Telegram channels. Our user and adversary VMs
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join these channels, and we perform our attacks in the same
setting as the Telegram experiments.
Figure 14 shows the performance of event-based and shape-
based detectors in both Signal and WhatsApp applications
using 15 minutes of traffic, demonstrating detection perfor-
mances comparable to those of Telegram. In particular, similar
to Telegram, for smaller false positive rates, the shape-based
detector has better performance while the event-based detector
achieves more accuracy for larger false positive rates. Our
results show that our attacks generalize to SIMs other than
Telegram due to the similarity of their traffic patterns,
which is due to these services not using any obfuscation
mechanisms.
D. Comparison with Deep Learning Techniques
As mentioned earlier in Section III-D, the recent work of
DeepCorr [58] uses deep learning classifiers to perform flow
correlation attacks on Tor. They demonstrate that deep learning
classifiers outperform statistical correlation techniques, like the
ones we used in our work, in correlating Tor connections. In
this section, we compare our IM classifiers with deep learning
classifiers. As we show in the following, our statistical clas-
sifiers outperform deep learning-based classifiers, specially
for shorter flow observations. Intuitively, this is due to the
sparsity of events in typical IM communications, as well as the
stationary nature of noise in IM communications in contrast
to the scenario of Tor. Note that this fully complies with
Nasr et al. [58]’s observation that DeepCorr only outperforms
statistical classifiers in non-stationary noisy conditions, where
statistical traffic models become inaccurate.
For fair comparisons, we obtain the original code of
DeepCorr [58], and adjust it to the specific setting of IM traffic.
Specifically, we divide the timing of each flow to equal periods
of length 1 second, and in each period we assign values of
{0, 1} to that period. We set the value of a period 1 if there
is a burst of packets in that period, and 0 if there is no burst
of packets. As an example, if we use 15 minutes of traffic
flows for correlation, our feature dimension is a 900-length
vector with values of 0, 1. We train our classifier using 500
associated flow pairs and 2, 000 non-associated flow pairs. We
test our (DeepCorr-based and statistical) classifiers using a
non-overlapping set of 200 associated flow pairs and 4, 000
non-associated.
Figure 11 shows the ROC curves of our event-based
detector compared with our deep learning-based detector, using
3 and 15 minutes of traffic. As we can see, our event-based
technique outperforms the deep learning-based classifier for
smaller false positive rates. For instance, for a false positive
rate of 10−3 and using 15 minutes of traffic, our event-
based detector achieves a 93% accuracy compared to 88% of
the DeepCorr-based technique. We see that the performance
advantage of our event-based detector significantly increases
for shorter flow observations, e.g., when 3 minutes of traffic
is used for detection, our classifier provides 92% accuracy
compared to 45% of the DeepCorr-based classifier (for the
a false positive rate of 10−3).
E. Simulations Using Synthetic Traffic
Our in-the-wild experiments, presented above, have been
done on a limited number of SIM channels, which is due to the
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Fig. 11: Comparing our event-based detector with a DeepCorr-
based classifier, for 3 and 15 minutes of traffic observation
fact that major SIM services put limits on the number of chan-
nels a client can join. To ensure the reliability of our results,
we generated a large number of synthetic SIM channels (using
the algorithm from Section IV-D), and evaluated our attack
performance on them. Our evaluations using 10,000 synthetic
IM channels complies with our results from our in-the-wild
experiments. We have presented our synthetic evaluations in
Appendix B.
F. Discussions
1) Impact of Other Channels: In our experiments, a target
user is the member/admin of only a single target channel,
while in practice a user may be a member/admin of multiple
channels. Therefore, a valid question is whether the traffic pat-
terns of other channels may interleave with the patterns of the
target channel and reduce the reliability of our detectors. We
argue that this will not be an issue as long as the detection is
performed during the time interval the user is visiting/posting
to the target channel. This is because when a user is visiting a
target channel, he will not receive the messages sent to other
channels (he will only receive some small-sized notifications).
Also, if an admin user simultaneously sends a message to
multiple channels, his upstream traffic (to the IM server) will
only contain a single message. Therefore, to identify whether
a given user is the member/admin of a target channel, the
adversary needs to continuously monitor that user until the
user visits or posts to the target channel.
2) Impact of Network Conditions: While we have per-
formed our experiments in specific network conditions, we
argue that our detectors will perform equivalently in other
network conditions as well. This is because in our presented
threat model, the adversary has knowledge on the network
conditions of each target user (e.g., the adversary can be the
ISP of the target user), and therefore she can adjust the detector
for various users, as shown in Table III. Also, note that natural
variations in a user’s network conditions will not impact the
detectors as IM traffic patterns are resilient to natural network
perturbations (e.g., the distance between IM bursts as shown
in Figure 2 are orders of magnitude larger than network jitter).
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VII. COUNTERMEASURES
We deploy and evaluate possible countermeasures against
our presented attacks. Intuitively, our attacks work because
in-the-wild SIM services do not deploy any mechanisms to
obfuscate traffic patterns. Therefore, we investigate various
traffic obfuscation mechanisms as countermeasures against our
traffic analysis-based attacks.
Note that obfuscation-based countermeasures have been
studied against other kinds of traffic analysis attacks
overviewed in Section III-D. There are several key ideas used
in existing countermeasures: (1) tunneling traffic through an
overlay system that perturbs its patterns [54], [62], e.g., Tor,
(2) adding background traffic (also called decoy) that is mixed
with the target traffic [29], [53], [66], [90], [96], (3) padding
traffic events (e.g., packets) [16], [17], [29], [46], [89], and
(4) delaying traffic events [16], [17], [29], [89], [90]. In the
following, we investigate various countermeasure techniques
inspired by these standard approaches.
A. Tunneling Through Circumvention Systems With/Without
Background Traffic
As the first countermeasure, we tunnel SIM traffic through
standard circumvention systems, in particular VPN and Tor
pluggable transports [86]. We use the same experimental
setup as before and connect to 300 Telegram channels. For
each circumvention system, we perform the experiments with
and without any background traffic. In the experiments with
background traffic, the VM running the SIM software also
makes HTTP connections using Selenium. The background
HTTP webpages are picked randomly from the top 50,000
Alexa websites. To amplify the impact of the background
traffic, the time between every two consecutive HTTP GETs
is taken from the empirical distribution of Telegram IMDs,
therefore producing a noise pattern similar to actual SIM
channels.
We observe that our event-based attack performs stronger
against our countermeasures. Therefore, we only present the
countermeasure results against the event-based detector (we
show the results for the shape-based attack in Appendix A).
Figure 15 shows the ROC curve of the event-based detector
using various circumvention systems and in different settings.
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Fig. 18: Design of our IMProxy countermeasure.
Our Tor experiments are done once with regular Tor, and once
using the obfs4 [62] transport with the IAT mode of 1, which
obfuscates traffic patterns.
We see that using regular Tor (with no additional obfusca-
tion) as well as using VPN does not significantly counter our
attacks, e.g., we get a TP of 85% and a FP of 5× 10−3 when
tunneling through these services (using 15 mins of traffic).
However, adding background traffic when tunneled through Tor
and VPN reduces the accuracy of the attack, but we get the best
countermeasure performance using Tor’s obfs4 obfuscator.
Note that tunneling through a generic circumvention sys-
tem like Tor is not the most attractive countermeasure to the
users due to the poor connection performance of such systems.
B. IMProxy: An Obfuscation Proxy Designed for IM Services
We design and implement a proxy-based obfuscation sys-
tem, called IMProxy4, built specifically for IM communica-
tions. IMProxy combines two obfuscation techniques: chang-
ing the timing of events (by adding delays), and changing
the sizes of events through adding dummy traffic. An IM
client has the ability to enable each of these countermeasures,
and specify the amplitude of obfuscation to make her desired
tradeoff between performance and resilience. IMProxy does
not require any cooperation from IM providers, and can be
used to obfuscate any IM service.
Components of IMProxy: Figure 18 shows the design of
IMProxy. For a client to use IMProxy, she needs to install a
LocalIMProxy software. LocalIMProxy runs a SOCKS5 proxy
listening on a local port. The client will need to change the
setting of her IM software (e.g., Telegram software) to use this
local port for proxying.
A second component of IMProxy is RemoteIMProxy,
which is a SOCKS5 proxy residing outside of the surveillance
area. The client needs to enter the (IP,port) information of this
remote proxy in the settings of her LocalIMProxy software.
Note that, in practice, RemoteIMProxy can be either run by
the client herself (e.g., as an AWS instance), or can be run
by the IM provider or trusted entities (similar to the MTProto
proxies run for Telegram users [56]).
How IMProxy works: Once an IM client sets up her system
to use IMProxy as above, her IM traffic to/from the IM servers
will be proxied by the proxies of IMProxy, as shown in
Figure 18. The IM traffic of the client will be handled by
4https://github.com/SPIN-UMass/IMProxy
LocalIMProxy and RemoteIMProxy, which obfuscate traffic
through padding and delaying.
As shown in the figure, IMProxy acts differently on up-
stream and downstream IM traffic. For upstream SIM com-
munications (e.g., messages sent by an admin), LocalIMProxy
adds padding to the traffic by injecting dummy packets and
events at certain locations. First, some dummy packets are
injected close to the events in order to change their sizes. The
size of padding for each event is chosen randomly, following a
uniform distribution in [0,rpadding], where rpadding is a param-
eter adjusted by each user. Second, some dummy events (burst
of packets) are injected during the silence intervals; this is done
randomly: during each 1 second silence interval, an event is
injected with a probability ppadding , where ppadding is also
adjusted by each individual user. The size of dummy events
is drawn from the empirical distribution of the sizes of image
messages, as presented earlier. Finally, the dummy packets are
removed by RemoteIMProxy before getting forwarded to the
IM server. Note that all traffic between LocalIMProxy and
RemoteIMProxy is encrypted so the adversary can not identify
the dummy packets.
For downstream SIM communications (e.g., messages re-
ceived by a member), RemoteIMProxy adds dummy packets,
as above, which are dropped by LocalIMProxy before being
released to the client’s IM software. In addition to padding,
RemoteIMProxy delays the packets in the downstream traffic.
In our implementation, RemoteIMProxy uses an Exponential
Distribution with rate λ to generate random delays (which is
based on our delay model in Figure 5). Note that no delay
is applied on upstream traffic, as the delay will transit to the
corresponding downstream traffic.
Note that each client can control the intensity of padding
by adjusting the ppadding and rpadding parameters, and control
control the amplitude of delays by adjusting λ.
Implementation: We have implemented IMProxy in Python
using the socketserver module. We use a Threading TCP
Server and Stream Request Handler to implement the SOCKS5
proxy in python. We have released our software as open source.
Evaluation against oblivious adversary: We first evaluate
our IMProxy implementation against an adversary who is not
aware of how IMProxy works (or its existence). To do so, we
evaluate IMProxy against our event-based detector.
Figure 16 shows the ROC curve of the event-based de-
tector for different values of λ. Note that 1λ defines the
average amount of delay added to the packets. As we can
see, increasing the added delay (by reducing λ) reduces the
performance of our attack, as it causes to missalign events
across the monitored flows. For instance, a 1λ = 1s reduces
the adversary’s TP from 93% to 86% (for a constant 10−3
false positive).
Figure 17 shows the ROC curves of the event-based detec-
tor with different rpadding and ppadding = 10−4. Note that a
ppadding = 10
−4 causes a 7% average traffic overhead (please
refer to Appendix C on how bandwidth overhead is calculated).
As expected, increasing rpadding reduces the performance of
our attack; even a rpadding as small of 10% and 7% of
dummy events can have a noticeable impact on countering
the traffic analysis attacks, i.e., for a 10−3 false positive rate,
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Fig. 19: Evaluating IMProxy against an IMProxy-aware clas-
sifier (trained using DeepCorr).
the detection accuracy is reduced from 93% to 62%. Increasing
rpadding to 50% will further reduce detection accuracy to 56%.
Evaluation against IMProxy-aware adversary: Next, we
evaluate IMProxy against an adversary who is aware that target
users are deploying IMProxy and also knows the details of
IMProxy. Our adversary trains a DeepCorr-based classifier on
IM traffic obfuscated using IMProxy (note that our statistical
detectors will suffer for such an adversary due to the random-
ness of IMProxy’s obfuscation).
Figure 19 shows the performance of this DeepCorr-based
classifier against IMProxy-obfuscated connections (each flow
is 15 mins). We use rpadding = 0.1 and evaluate the per-
formance for different values of ppadding . As can be seen,
IMProxy is highly effective even against an IMProxy-aware
classifier, demonstrating IMProxy’s efficiency in manipulating
IM traffic patterns. For instance, for a false positive rate of
10−3, the IMProxy-aware classifier provides true positive rates
of 25% and 15% (for average obfuscation delays of 0.5 and 1),
which is significantly weaker compared to 93% of the event-
based detector when IMProxy is not deployed. As we can see,
delaying provides better protection than padding; however, we
expect that most users will prefer padding over delays due to
the latency-sensitive nature of IM communications.
Note that each user can choose her desired tradeoff between
privacy protection and overhead by adjusting the counter-
measure parameters. Ideally, the countermeasure software can
ask the user her tolerable padding/delay overhead (or her
target FP/FN for the adversary), and then will choose the best
countermeasure parameters for the user. For instance, based on
Figure 19, assuming that a real-world adversary can tolerate
a FP of 10−3, if the user states that she intends to keep the
adversary’s TP below 0.3, the countermeasure software will
delay packets with an average of 1s.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we showed how popular IM applications
leak sensitive information about their clients to adversaries
who merely monitor encrypted traffic. Specifically, we devised
traffic analysis attacks that enable an adversary to identify
the administrators and members of target IM channels with
practically high accuracies. We demonstrated the practicality
of our attacks through extensive experiments on real-world IM
systems. We believe that our study presents a significant, real-
world threat to the users of such services given the escalating
attempts by oppressive governments in cracking down on
social media.
We also investigated the use of standard countermeasures
against our attacks and demonstrated their practical feasibility
at the cost of communication overhead and increased IM la-
tency. We designed and implemented an open-source, publicly
available countermeasure system, IMProxy, which works for
major IM services with no need to support from the IM
providers. While IMProxy may be used as an ad hoc, short-
term countermeasure by IM users, we believe that to achieve
the best usability and user adoption, effective countermeasures
should be deployed by IM providers (i.e., through integrating
traffic obfuscation techniques into their software). We hope
that our study will urge IM providers to take action.
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APPENDIX
A. Countermeasures Against Shape-Based Detection
Figure 20 shows the performance of the shape-based de-
tector while tunneling traffic through circumvention systems.
Experiment setting for Tor, VPN, and background traffic has
exactly the same settings as in Section VII-A. However, results
show that circumvention systems are more impactful on the
shape-based detector. Again, only passing traffic through a
VPN or Tor does not effect the performance of the detector
significantly, and shape-based detector has about an 80% true
positive rate while false positive rate is 0.003. Similar to
Section VII-A, adding web browsing background traffic or
using Tor pluggable transports can impact the performance of
the shape-based detection.
B. Simulations Using Synthetic Traffic
As mentioned earlier, major SIM services limit the number
of channels a client can join; this limits the reliability of our
in-the-wild evaluations. To address, we generate synthetic SIM
channels to evaluate our detectors on a much larger number
of synthetically created IM channels.
Creating Synthetic SIM Communications: We use Algo-
rithm 1 discussed in Section IV-D to create synthetic SIM
events (i.e., messages). To convert these SIM events into SIM
traffic, we need to simulate the impact of network conditions
and other perturbations. Specifically, we apply the effect of
network latency according to a Laplacian distribution (see
section IV-C). Suppose that t(C) = {t(C)1 , . . . , t(C)n } and
s(C) = {s(C)1 , . . . , s(C)n } are the vectors of timings and sizes
of messages in a synthetic channel, and let d = {d1, . . . , dn}
be the vector of latencies generated according to a Laplacian
distribution. We derive the vector of timings and sizes of the
target user flow as follows:{
t
(U)
i = t
(C)
i − di, 1 ≤ i ≤ n
s
(U)
i = s
(C)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n
Note that we assume that sizes remain the same in transit. We
also simulate the impact of burst extraction noise. Assume the
user’s bandwidth is bw. Let t(l)i =
s
(U)
i
bw be the time it takes the
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Fig. 20: The impact of various coun-
termeasures on the performance of the
shape-based detector (15 minutes of
observed traffic).
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Fig. 21: Performance of the shape-
based and event-based detectors over
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Fig. 22: Comparing the analytical up-
per bounds of the event-based detector
(Section V-A) with empirical results
(for 15 minutes of traffic).
target user to send the ith message. We merge two consecutive
messages in the target user’s traffic if t(U)i+1 − t(U)i − t(l)i < te.
Comparing our Two Attacks: We apply our shape-based
and event-based detectors on the synthetically-generated SIM
traffic. Specifically, we create 10, 000 synthetic SIM commu-
nications (in contrast to 500 in the real-world experiments).
The channels are divided into five rate buckets. To evaluate
false positives, we cross-correlate every SIM client with all
the 10, 000 − 1 connects in her rate bucket. Figure 21 shows
the ROC curve of the shape-based and event-based detectors
over synthetic channels. We can see that, similar to the in-the-
wild experiments, the shape-based detector achieves a higher
accuracy for smaller false positive rates.
Comparing To Analytical Bounds We also compare our
empirical results with the analytical upper bounds of Sec-
tion V-A. Figure 22 shows the ROC curve of analytical results
and experiments using 15 minutes of traffic. As expected, for
a fixed false positive rate, the analytical results (formula 1
and 3) upper bound the real-world true positive rate of our
event-based detector for both actual and simulated Telegram
traffic. Our analytical bound is particularly more useful for
smaller values of FP: performing credible experiments for
small FPs require a significantly large number of intercepted
IM connections which is impractical to capture in experiments.
C. Overhead of Padding Through Dummy Events
TABLE V: Bandwidth overheads of padding through dummy
events for different values of ppadding .
ppadding Bandwidth Overhead
0.0001 7%
0.0005 34%
0.001 67%
Here, we calculate the bandwidth overhead of adding
dummy events as introduced in Section VII-B. We assume
that the number of periods in which there is a dummy event
follows a Binomial distribution with parameters ppadding and
the size of the observed flow. Therefore, the average number
of dummy events in each flow will follow the mean of the
Binomial distribution, which is equal to ppadding × `, where `
is the length of observed flows in seconds. The size of each
dummy event is sampled from our collection of IM image
messages, which has an average size of 90Kb. Therefore, we
can evaluate the bandwidth overhead of dummy events by
dividing the average volume of dummy events over the volume
of actual IM messages in long traffic observations. This is
shown in Table C for different values of ppadding .
D. Rate-Based Transition Matrices
The following is the empirical transition probability matrix
of the Markov model we use to model IM message sizes (in
Section IV-C) for the aggregation of all channels:
P =

0.40 0.47 0.10 0.01 0.02
0.29 0.53 0.11 0.02 0.05
0.19 0.36 0.40 0.02 0.03
0.17 0.59 0.13 0.09 0.02
0.14 0.40 0.10 0.01 0.35

The following are the transition matrices for groups of
channels with different average daily message rates of 2.31,
7.68, 18.34, 39.47, and 130.57, respectively. We see that the
models change slightly for different types of channels.
P1 =

0.48 0.41 0.07 0.00 0.04
0.28 0.52 0.11 0.01 0.08
0.12 0.32 0.49 0.00 0.07
0.14 0.43 0.14 0.00 0.29
0.13 0.44 0.06 0.00 0.38
P2 =

0.55 0.28 0.10 0.02 0.05
0.18 0.59 0.11 0.01 0.12
0.13 0.35 0.45 0.01 0.07
0.17 0.36 0.14 0.33 0.00
0.19 0.34 0.10 0.03 0.33

P3 =

0.45 0.38 0.12 0.02 0.04
0.22 0.55 0.13 0.03 0.07
0.15 0.35 0.42 0.04 0.05
0.15 0.54 0.20 0.51 0.06
0.13 0.31 0.10 0.03 0.43
P4 =

0.38 0.44 0.14 0.02 0.02
0.24 0.50 0.15 0.03 0.09
0.17 0.35 0.43 0.03 0.03
0.20 0.55 0.15 0.09 0.01
0.09 0.46 0.11 0.01 0.33

P5 =

0.40 0.48 0.09 0.01 0.01
0.32 0.53 0.10 0.02 0.04
0.21 0.37 0.39 0.02 0.02
0.16 0.63 0.11 0.08 0.01
0.16 0.41 0.10 0.01 0.32

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